Meaning of the Text A Jewel Lamp to Illuminate the Characteristics of Phenomena Here, to develop certainty about the general meaning of the Collected Topics, to begin writing this commentary called A Jewel Lamp to Illuminate the Characteristics of Phenomena: (pg 3) 1. Objects Of Knowledge, The Basis To Be Categorized 2. The Categories Of Objects To Be Known Objects To Be Known, The Basis To Be Categorized 1. The Definition of Objects of Knowledge 2. Synonyms of Objects of Knowledge 3. Definitions of the Synonyms 4. Detailed Explanation of Definitions, Definiendums, and Bases The Definition of Objects of Knowledge The definition of objects of knowledge is: suitable to be an object of mind. The etymology of this is: from the facet of their being suitable to be general objects of mind of beings from sentient beings to Buddhas, all phenomena such as pillars and vases are objects of knowledge. Examples of objects of knowledge are: (The definition of an example is: that which faultlessly supports the definition-definiendum pair.) pillars, vas-es, form, consciousness, omniscience, space, true cessations, the isolate of pillar, one with pillar, different from pillar, generic images, the non-existence of the horn of a rab-bit, the two— pillars and vase; the two, permanent and impermanent things; objects of knowledge for which being it is impossible; etc. Not being objects of knowledge are: horn of a rabbit; the permanence of a vase; the non-existence of karmic cause and effect; the self of a person; being both a pillar and a vase, and so on. Furthermore, something like the ‘existence of space as a sub-stance’ is an object of knowledge for Vaibashikas, but not for tenet systems from Sau-tantrika on up. Truly existent mind and form are objects of knowledge for tenet systems from Cittamantra on down, but not for Madhyamika. Inherently existent vases are ob-jects of knowledge for Svatantrika Madhyamika, but not for Prasangika Madhyamika. There are endless differences in what is or is not presented as objects of knowledge by the various tenet systems. Synonyms of Objects of Knowledge Synonyms of objects of knowledge are: objects of knowledge; existents; estab-lished bases; objects of cognition; observed objects; phenomena. Being mutually coex-tensive is the definition of a synonym and those things are mutually coextensive. It is like this: objects of knowledge (pg 4) and existents are synonyms because the two of them are mutually coextensive. This follows because if something is an object of knowledge it must be an existent; and if something is an existent it must be an object of knowledge. The same can be applied to the rest of the synonyms, objects of knowledge and established bases, etc. Definitions of the Synonyms As for the definitions of those: The definition of an existent is: the object of observation of a valid mind. The et-ymology: they are existents from the point of view of their being objects of observation by a valid mind as existent, which has severed superimpositions of their being non-existent or clinging to their non-existence. In saying that vases and pillars are observed to be existent, having examined whether a hidden phenomenon such as the ‘imperma-nence of a compounded phenomenon’ exists or not, having severed superimpositions of its being non-existent or clinging to its non-existence, it is observed to be existent; whereas with regard to manifest phenomena such as pillars and vases, for the most part they need not be analyzed as to whether they exist or not, because superimposi-tions of their non-existence and clinging to their non-existence are severed just by ob-serving them. A valid mind is valid because it is unmistaken with regard to the exist-ence of the object of its mode of apprehension. If vases, pillars, and so forth are ob-served, since they are existent, superimpositions of their non-existence are severed. By severing that, superimpositions clinging to their non-existence are also severed and they will not arise again. Therefore, minds such as mistaken awareness cannot estab-lish the existence of objects by observing them. Valid minds can establish the existence of objects upon merely observing them. Invalid minds cannot establish the existence of objects by observing them because, although the thought that clings to the perma-nence of a pillar observes it to be permanent, a permanent pillar is not an established base. The definition of an established base is: something established by valid cogni-tion. The etymology: examining with a valid mind whether a phenomenon such as a vase or pillar is existent or not; and examining its mode of existence with a valid mind, from the point of view of it being existent and established to be existent, it is an estab-lished base. For example, examining with a valid mind whether a vase exists of not, since the vase is established to be existent, the vase is an established base. Examining with valid cognition whether a vase is permanent or impermanent, (pg 5) since the vase is established to be impermanent, impermanence of the vase is an established base; and examining with a valid mind whether the vase is an object of knowledge or not, since it is established to be an object of knowledge, the ‘object of knowledge of the vase’ is also an established base. Any existent isolate found on the basis of the vase can likewise be applied to all phenomena. By applying it to all phenomena such as pil-lars and space you should understand how they are established bases. The definition of ‘object of cognition’ is that which is realized by a valid mind. The etymology is that every phenomenon such as pillars and vases, from the point of view of their being objects directly realized by valid mind, objects indirectly realized by valid mind, or objects realized by force of a previous mind, they are asserted to be objects of cognition. For example, vases, etc, are objects directly realized by valid mind. Objects of cognition are realized by all three of these modes. Likewise, the impermanence of the vase, etc, can be applied to all phenomena as objects of cognition, same as for es-tablished bases above. The definition of ‘observed object’ is a basis for valid mind to sever superimposi-tion. The etymology is that any phenomena, such as pillars and vases, no matter how many misconceptions have been superimposed upon them, from the point of view of their being bases for valid mind to sever superimposition, they are observed objects. For example, a vase is a base for valid mind realizing its impermanence to sever su-perimpositions of it being permanent. Vase is a base for valid mind realizing it is a func-tioning thing (ie. impermanent thing) to sever superimpositions of it being a nonfunc-tioning thing (permanent thing). And so on, since it is a base for severing infinite super-impositions such as these, it is an observed object. Impermanence of the vase is a base for valid mind to sever superimpositions of it being a non-functioning thing; and since it is a base for severing all other superimpositions, impermanence of the vase is an observed object. The same should be applied for all phenomena. The definition of phenomena is ‘holding its own entity.’ The etymology is that any phenomena such as pillars and vases hold both their general and particular entities; in that they are endowed with these two, they are phenomena. Phenomena is equivalent to ‘dharma’ which means ‘holding.’ For instance, because the vase is pervaded by holding the general nature of an object of knowledge, and holding its particular nature of being bulbous, (pg 6) it is a phenomenon. This pertains to all objects of knowledge (all knowable objects, all existents, all phenomena). If something is an established base it is pervaded by holding many general na-tures because, if something is an established base, it is pervaded by having the nature of an object of knowledge, the nature of an existent, and the nature of an object of ob-servation. This follows because, if something is an established base, it is pervaded by being an object of knowledge, etc. It is so pervaded because it is the entity of those phenomena which are its nature. Explanation of Definitions, Definiendums, and Bases Detailed explanation of definitions, definiendums, and bases has two parts: ex-planation of the general meaning of definitions, definiendums, and bases; and applying those to bases. Explanation of the General Meaning of Definitions, Defined Terms or Definiendums, and Bases or Examples A definition is the very isolate of that defined example or designated base that it defines or designates, defining or designating it unmixed with others. As for such a designation, it must be free of three faults: not pervading all facets of its definiendum; being too per-vasive, pervading that which is not its definiendum; or being impossible for it to be the isolate of the meaning of its definiendum. There are eight ways in which a definition and a definiendum must be mutually pervasive; the definition must be proved to be the isolate of the meaning of the definiendum. This is because, without fulfilling this re-quirement, it will not be a definition which defines, on the basis of a defined example, the isolate of the meaning of its definiendum unmixed with anything else. Because of this, any definition and definiendum must pervade each other in eight ways in which they are each other; and the definition must be proved to be the isolate of the meaning of the definiendum. As for the eight ways of mutual pervasion are, the first four are: if it is that definition it must be that definiendum if it is not that definition it must not be that definiendum if there exists that definition there must exist that definiendum (pg 7) if that definition does not exist that definiendum must not exist The second four are: if it is that definiendum it must be that definition if it is not that definiendum it must not be that definition if there exists that definiendum there must exist that definition if that definiendum does not exist that definition must not exist Applying These To Bases Second, to apply the above, how a definition establishing that an example, on the basis of that example, is an isolate of the meaning it defines unmixed with anything else, in the case of a particular base. The vase, an example, is an object of knowledge, the definiendum, because of being suitable to be an object of mind, the definition. The vase, from the aspect of its being suitable to be an object of mind, is thus established as an object of knowledge. Such establishment shows that a vase, the example, because of being the definition, ‘suitable to be an object of mind’, is the defin-iendum, an ‘object of knowledge.’ (pg 8) Likewise, an example of object of knowledge, ‘the impermanence of a vase,’ by being the definition, ‘suitable to be an object of mind,’ is demonstrated to be the definiendum, an object of knowledge. How? From the point of view of the imperma-nence of the vase being suitable to be an object of mind it is demonstrated or estab-lished to be an object of knowledge. In a similar way understand how all phenomena are objects of knowledge: other isolates based on the vase, space, true cessations, the generic image of the vase, the non-existence of the horn of a rabbit, and so on. By way of being suitable to be an object of mind, the vase can be established or understood to be an object of knowledge only. Being suitable to be an object of mind cannot establish or aid in understanding that the vase is an existent or another of its isolates. By reason of being suitable to be an object of mind you can understand the facet of the vase being an object of knowledge; not the facet of the vase being an ex-istent or another of its isolates. This follows because there exists a person who, by rea-son of the vase being suitable to be an object of mind, understands that it is an object of knowledge, but who does not understand that it is an existent. Similarly, the vase being ‘observed by a valid awareness’ only establishes and facilitates ascertainment of the facet of the vase being an existent; thus the many iso-lates of various definiendums must each be established by means of their own individ-ual definitions. This can be applied to all phenomena from space to forms. Since that is the case, in any three-fold set of definition, definiendum, and example, the example is distinguished as being the isolate of a that particular single phenomena, and that is a sublime precept to understand. For example, through the meaning of a pillar being suitable to be an object of mind, it is posited to be an object of knowledge. Likewise, any example, because of being such and such a definition, is posited to be the defini-endum of that definition; because if the example was not that definition, just as a pillar cannot illustrate that a golden vase is a vase, the definition could not illustrate that the example is that definiendum. It also cannot illustrate it if all of the three elements are not separate isolates. Like saying the pillar is a pillar because of being a pillar; there is nothing to be understood by reason of the pillar being a pillar. Likewise, there is nothing to be understood by saying a vase is an object of knowledge because of being an ob-ject of knowledge. Thus, a definition can only posit something to be the isolate of its own definien-dum. As it is said, Not being pervasive, being too pervasive, or being impossible: these are the three general ways any definition may be faulty. Thus, a definition must be free from three faults which are three ways of not being the isolate of the meaning of its definiendum: not pervading some instances of its definien-dum; pervading additional instances other than its definiendum; and being impossible to be its definiendum. If a definition does not pervade some parts or aspects of its de-finiendum, it cannot indicate all parts of its definiendum. If it pervades, in addition to its definiendum, something other than its definiendum, it cannot indicate its own definien-dum unmixed with other phenomena that are not its definiendum; which in turn may cause a misconception perceiving as its definiendum phenomena which are not its de-finiendum. This is because if a definition is not the isolate of the meaning of its defini-endum it cannot illustrate or indicate its definiendum. The root reason is established because, for instance, if we say that the ability to perform a function is the definition of object of knowledge, although this pervades impermanent phenomena, it does not per-vade uncompounded phenomena such as space; (pg 10) then such things as space could not be posited as objects of knowledge. Taking the ability to perform a function as the definition of object of knowledge, the first four pervasions pertain: if something is able to perform a function it must be an object of knowledge; if there is ability to perform a function there must be object of knowledge; if it is not able to perform a function it must not be an object of knowledge; and if there is no ability to perform a function there must not be an object of knowledge. However, the following four pervasions do not pertain: if it is not able to perform a func-tion it must not be an object of knowledge; if there is no ability to perform a function there is no object of knowledge; if it is an object of knowledge it must be able to per-form a function; and if there is an object of knowledge there must be ability to perform a function. This is the defining characteristic of not being pervasive. The second root reason is established because, for instance, if ability to perform a function is taken to be the definition of a vase, since all impermanent phenomena such as pillars are also able to perform a function, that definition cannot indicate the isolate of vase unmixed with pillars and so forth. Since this would indicate that things other than vases such as pillars are vases, it could give rise to the misconception that they are vases. This is the defining characteristic of a definition being too pervasive. Four pervasions pertain: if it is not able to perform a function it must not be a vase; if there is no ability to perform a function there must not be a vase; if it is a vase it must be able to perform a function; and if there is a vase there must be ability to perform a function. However, the following four pervasions do not pertain, they are not perva-sions: if it is able to perform a function it must be a vase; if there is ability to perform a function there must be a vase; if it is not a vase it must not be able to perform a func-tion; and if there is no vase there must be no ability to perform a function. Such is the defining characteristic of a definition being too pervasive. The third root reason is established because, for instance, if ‘produced from causes and conditions’ were taken to be the definition of uncompounded phenomena, because it is impossible for that to be the meaning of uncompounded phenomena, and because that is contradictory with uncompounded phenomena, it cannot facilitate an understanding of uncompounded phenomena. Applying these eight ways of pervasion between a definition and its definiendum, let’s take the definiendum, object of knowledge, and its definition, suitable to be an ob-ject of mind. 1. If something is suitable to be an object of mind it must be an object of knowledge. Why? Because there is nothing suitable to be an object of mind that is not an object of knowledge. 2. If something is not suitable to be an object of mind it must not be an object of knowledge. Why? Because it is impossible for something to be an object of knowledge if it is not suitable to be an object of mind. 3. If there is something that is suitable to be an object of mind there must be an object of knowledge. Why? Because whenever there is something that is suitable to be an object of mind, that very thing is also an object of knowledge. 4. If there is not something suitable to be an ob-ject of mind there is no object of knowledge. Why? Because whenever there is nothing suitable to be an object of mind there must also be no object of knowledge. This follows because if there is an object of knowledge, that very object of knowledge is also suita-ble to be an object of mind. 5. If it is an object of knowledge it must be suitable to be an object of mind. Why? Because there is nothing that is an object of knowledge that is not suitable to be an object of mind. 6. If it is not an object of knowledge it must not be suitable to be an object of mind. Why? Because it is impossible for something be suita-ble to be an object of mind and not be an object of knowledge. 7. If there is an object of knowledge there must be something suitable to be an object of mind. Why? Because whenever there is an object of knowledge, that existent object of knowledge is itself al-so suitable to be an object of mind. 8. If there is no object of knowledge there must be nothing suitable to be an object of mind. Why? Because if there is no object of knowledge there must also be nothing suitable to be an object of mind. This follows be-cause that which is suitable to be an object of mind is, itself, also an object of knowledge. This should be applied to all definitions and definiendum. Suitable to be an object of mind is a meaning-isolate because it is the meaning-isolate of object of knowledge. This follows because suitable to be an object of mind is the meaning of phenomena such as pillars and vases being objects of knowledge; and it is the opposite of not being the meaning of object of knowledge. The latter reason fol-lows because it is that factor of being the isolate of the meaning of object of knowledge which is different from being the isolate of the meanings of other phenomena such as ‘being observed by a valid mind,’ or ‘being able to perform a function.’ Object of knowledge is its own isolate, its ‘self-isolate’ (a phenomenon conceptually isolated by itself) because that factor of being object of knowledge is unmixed or unconfused with other phenomena that exist such as vases and pillars or with other isolates; and be-cause it is the opposite of not being the self-isolate of object of knowledge. Examples of object of knowledge such as vases are example isolates because they are bases which ‘suitable to be an object of mind’ can demonstrate to be objects of knowledge; and they are opposite of not being a base which can demonstrate that; because vases and such are the opposite of not being examples of object of knowledge. The above should be applied similarly to all instances of definition, definiendum, and examples. Furthermore, in general, all definitions such as suitable to be an object of mind must be three substantially existent phenomena complete; and all definiendums such as object of knowledge must be three imputedly existent phenomena complete. The three substantially existent phenomena are 1. being a definition in general, 2. being es-tablished on the basis of its examples and 3. not acting as the definition of any other definiendum than its own. The three imputedly existent phenomena are 1. being a de-finiendum in general, 2. being established on the basis of its examples, and 3. not act-ing as the definiendum of any definition other than its own. To apply this to a basis: The subject, suitable to be an object of mind is a definition because it is three substan-tially existent phenomena complete. This follows because it is a definition in general, it is established on the basis of its examples, and it does not act as the definition of any phenomena other than its definiendum. The subject, suitable to be an object of mind is a definition in general because its ex-pression is in no way a definiendum, but only a definition; and that being the case, be-cause it is the definition of object of knowledge. The subject, suitable to be an object of mind is established on the basis of its examples because it is established on the basis of examples —such as vases and pillars—of that which it presents or defines—objects of knowledge. This follows because all phenome-na such as vases and pillars are it. This follows because all phenomena such as vases and pillars are suitable to be objects of mind. The subject, suitable to be an object of mind, does not act as the definition of any defin-iendum other than its own, because other than acting as the definition of object of knowledge, it does not act as the definition of any other phenomena such as ‘existent,’ ‘observed,’ or ‘functioning thing.’ This follows because it is the isolate of the meaning of object of knowledge and no other definiendum. The subject, object of knowledge is a definiendum because it is three imputedly exist-ent phenomena complete. This follows because it is a definiendum in general, it is es-tablished on the basis of its examples, and it does not act as the definiendum of any definition other than its own. The subject, object of knowledge, is a definiendum in general because the thrust of the expression in general in this context is not at all a definition, but only a definiendum; and that being the case, it is the definiendum of suitable to be an object of mind. The subject, object of knowledge, is established on the basis of its examples because it is established on the basis of things such as vases and pillars, which are examples or bases of what is posited by its definition, suitable to be an object of mind. The subject, object of knowledge does not act as the definiendum of any definition oth-er than its own, because other than acting as the definiendum of the definition, suitable to be an object of mind, it is the definiendum of on other phenomena such as being able to perform a function or being observed by a valid mind. This follows because the isolate of its meaning is only ‘suitable to be an object of mind’ and no other. Definition and definiendum are contradictions in that there is nothing which is both defi-nition and definiendum. This follows because suitable to be an object of mind is a defi-nition; not a definiendum. Object of knowledge is a definiendum, not a definition. This is the case for all other definitions and their definiendum as well. Thus, definitions and definiendum are contradictions. Yet, suitable to be an object of mind, a definition, and object of knowledge, its definiendum, are mutually coextensive; because as long as something is suitable to be an object of mind it is impossible for it not to be an object of knowledge. As long as something is an object of knowledge it is impossible for it not be suitable to be an object of mind. The definition and definiendum of object of knowledge are contradictions because the definition of object of knowledge is suitable to be an object of mind and that is a definition; not at all a definiendum. And because there is no other definition of object of knowledge. Furthermore, ‘suitable to be an object of mind,’ ‘object of knowledge,’ and ‘example of object of knowledge’ are all three one nature and coextensive, because they are all mutually coextensive. This follows because ‘suitable to be an object of mind’ and ‘ob-ject of knowledge’ are coextensive, while object of knowledge and example of object of knowledge are also coextensive; and because suitable to be an object of mind and ex-ample of object of knowledge are also coextensive. The last follows because suitable to be an object of mind is also an example of object of knowledge. This follows because it is a base by which it may illustrate being an object of knowledge. This follows because it is an object of knowledge. There is a pervasion because if something is an object of knowledge it must be posited as an object of knowledge because of being suitable to be an object of mind. Therefore, if something is an established base it is an example of many different definiendums. If something is a definiendum it must be the definiendum of no more than one definition; whereas if something is a definition is it pervaded by being the def-inition of no more than one definiendum. As for how to apply definitions such as ‘suitable to be an object of mind’ to phe-nomena such as vases as the definiendum of that definition: the vase being suitable to be an object of mind is the definition of the vase being an object of knowledge. The vase being observed by valid cognition is the definition of the vase being an existent. The vase being able to perform a function is the definition of the vase being a function-ing thing. The vase being suitable to be form is the definition of the vase being form. The vase being suitable to be an aggregation of many forms is the definition of the vase being the form aggregate. The vase being contaminated, born from its causes of delusion and karma is the definition of the vase being a true suffering, and so on, the vase being the isolate of infinite definiendums can be posited by each of their different definitions unmixed with each other. All phenomena should be understood similarly. Furthermore, suitable to be an object of mind being suitable to be an object of mind is the definition of suitable to be an object of mind being an object of knowledge. Object of knowledge being suitable to be an object of mind is the definition of object of knowledge being an object of knowledge. The two, vases and pillars being suitable to be objects of mind is the definitions of the two, vases and pillars, being objects of knowledge. Being suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is possible is the defini-tion of an object of knowledge for which being it is possible. Examples are pillars; the sky; the two, pillar and object of knowledge, and so on. The subject, a pillar, is an object of knowledge for which being it is possible because it is suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is possible. This follows because its being exists and it is suitable to be an object of mind; which follows because its being exists. The subject, the two, pillar and object of knowledge is an object of knowledge for which being it is possible because it is suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is possible. This follows because the being of the two exists and it is suitable to be an ob-ject of mind. Why? This follows because a common locus of being a pillar and also be-ing an object of knowledge does exist. This follows because pillar is such a common locus. The pillar being suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is possible is the def-inition of pillar being an object of knowledge for which being it is possible. The two, pi-llar and object of knowledge being suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is possible is the definition of the two, pillar and object of knowledge being an object of knowledge for which being it is possible. Being suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is impossible is the definition of an object of knowledge for which being it is impossible. Examples are the two, form and consciousness; the two, permanence and functioning thing; the two, pillar and vase; the two, Devadatta and Devadatta’s eye; and so forth. The subject, the two, vase and pillar is an object of knowledge for which being it is im-possible because it is suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is impossible. This follows because there is nothing that is the two, vase and pillar, and the two, vase and pillar, are suitable to be an object of mind; and there is nothing that is a pillar and that is a vase. The two, vase and pillar, being suitable to be an object of mind for which being it is im-possible is the definition of the two, vase and pillar being an object of knowledge for which being it is impossible. If something is an established base there is a pervasion that it must be either an object of knowledge for which being it is possible or an object of knowledge for which being it is impossible; that is because there is no established base or phenomenon that is not one of those two. Apply this similarly for others. A vase being suitable to be an object of mind is not the definition of object of knowledge yet it is a facet or part of the definition of object of knowledge. It is easy to understand that it is not the definition of object of knowledge because there is no pervasion that it is either a definition or a definiendum. All phe-nomena such as a vase being suitable to be an object of mind are each facets of being suitable to be an object of mind and the collection of them all is called the collection of the parts being suitable to be an object of mind because the words, suitable to be an object of mind, in this case encompasses the sum of all those parts. Therefore, the vase being suitable to be an object of mind is both the definition of the vase being an object of knowledge and also a part of the definition of object of knowledge. Also, the vase being an object of knowledge is not the definiendum of the defini-tion, suitable to be an object of mind, but it is a facet of that definiendum be-cause…here bring forth a reason similar to the previous one. Therefore, the vase being an object of knowledge is both the definiendum of the vase being suitable to be an ob-ject of mind, as well as a facet of the definiendum of suitable to be an object of mind. Suitable to be an object of mind is considered to be the only definition of object of knowledge. If someone were to say, ‘The subject, horn of a rabbit is an object of knowledge be-cause it is suitable to be an object of mind. This follows because it is suitable to be the object of the mind that perceives it,’ there is no pervasion. That is because suitable to be an object of mind is not the same as suitable to be an object of the mind which per-ceives it because it means suitable to be a general object of the minds of sentient be-ings to buddhas; and horns of rabbits are not general objects of the mind. The latter reason is established because horns of rabbits only exist for mistaken consciousnesses and are not generally established bases. The reason presented prior to stating the lack of pervasion, that the subject, horn of a rabbit is suitable to be the object of the mind that perceives it, is established because it is suitable to be the object of the conceptual mind that perceives it. If someone says, ‘Well then, a vase is not an object of knowledge because it is not suitable to be an object of mind. This follows because it is not suitable to be a general object of the mind; which follows because a vase is not suitable to be an object of all minds,’ there is no pervasion. That is because a vase being ‘suitable to be an object of mind’ is considered to mean that it is suitable to be an object of general minds from sentient beings to buddhas that perceive vases; not that it is suitable to be an object of all minds. The reason stated before the assertion of lack of pervasion is established because a vase is not suitable to be the object of auditory or olfactory consciousness. Second General Topic An Explanation of the Divisions of Objects of Knowledge in Thirteen Parts Second, the divisions of objects of knowledge are: first, a two-fold division into definitions and definiendums a two-fold division into generalities and particularities a two-fold division into contradictory and related phenomena a two-fold division into permanent phenomena and functioning things a two-fold division into self-characterized and generally-characterized phenomena a two-fold division into the two truths a three-fold division into fully imputed, other-powered, and fully established phenomena a two-fold division into substantial phenomena and refuted phenomena a two-fold division into negations and existents a two-fold division into manifest and hidden phenomena a two-fold division into subjects and objects a two-fold division into singularities and pluralities a three-fold division into virtue, non-virtue, and neutral phenomena